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Abstract— CPS (Cyber-Physical Systems) is proposed by the 
NSF (National Scientific Foundation) to describe a type of 
necessities which conglomerates hardware and software 
components and being the next step in development of 
embedded systems. CPS includes a wide range of research topics 
from signal processing to data analysis. This paper contains a 
brief review of the basic infrastructure for CPS including smart 
objects and network aspects in relation to TCP/IP stack. As CPS 
reflect the processes of the physical environment onto the cyber 
space, virtualisation as important tool for abstraction plays 
crucial role in CPS. In this context paper presents the challenges 
associated with mobility and vritualisation; accordingly, three 
main types of virtualisation, namely network, devices and 
applications virtualisation are presented in the paper. The main 
focus of the paper is made on security. Different threats, attack 
types and possible consequences are discussed as well as analysis 
of various approaches to cope with existing threats is 
introduced. Furthermore, needs and requirements for safety-
critical CPS are reviewed. 
Keywords— CPS, Systems, Security, Safety, Virtualisation 
I. INTRODUCTION  
CPS is a concept focusing on bridging physical and cyber 
worlds. Firstly, the term of CPS was proposed by NSF, where 
CPS are described as complex engineered systems devoted to 
integration of cyber and physical components to extend 
capabilities of recent embedded systems [1]. This definition 
states clearly that CPS is the next evolution stage of 
Embedded Systems. CPS while compared to embedded 
systems are not limited by just one device, it is more an 
ecosystem of devices operating in the physical environment 
and being controlled by computational elements. Another 
similarity to CPS concept is Internet of Things (IoT) defined 
as global infrastructure connecting various physical and 
virtual entities called ‘things’ in order to provide advanced 
services [2]. 
In many areas of human activities, CPS has gained more 
and more attention, especially in the capacities where physical 
processes and physical equipment needed to be controlled, 
orchestrated and coordinated with humans, systems, or 
subsystems. The emerging trends like Industry 4.0 [3] or 
Industry Internet [4] are the key indicators of CPS importance; 
transition to these concepts will involve increasing 
automation, autonomy and complete new understanding of 
production processes. Major incentive, which forces CPS 
development is a need of convergence for physical processes 
and computational capabilities, where high degree of 
communication between components and abstraction of the 
processes occurring in the physical environment is needed. 
The scaling of the CPS systems, small and large scale 
respectively, is distinguished by number of involved 
components [5]. Small-scale CPS have just a little number of 
physical as well as cyber components while large-scale 
systems have hundreds or even thousands of components. 
Both of them can be geographically distributed, which may 
require convergence with global networks, such as Internet 
[6]. 
There were several efforts to develop a general model for 
CPS in order to give a clear idea of the main components of a 
CPS regardless of application domains. In [7], CPS is 
represented through three main layers: the first layer consists 
of sensors and actuators which observe changing physical 
environment; the second layer aims at communication and 
abstraction of the real-world processes and the third deals with 
computational capabilities. Another work in [8] describes an 
approach for CPS design consisting of three layers, namely 
physical layer, platform layer, and computation/ 
communication layer, where the last two layers are in fact 
cyber layers. To establish a comparison among the design 
concepts, there are common similarities such as the same 
number of design layers and similar functions performed by 
the layers. Thus, first layer in both concepts [7, 8] is focused 
on physical components operating in physical environment, 
whereas the second layer is aimed at interconnection of the 
lower and higher levels, storage and service composition with 
particular attention being paid to abstraction mechanisms and 
the last one serves to high level functions such as 
computational algorithms, processing, etc. However, there is 
some research work which purely focuses on architectures for 
specific application domains. As in [9], the four-layer 
architecture for CPS in healthcare domain is represented. 
General view of main layers and components of CPS can be 
represented as in Fig. 1. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Infrastructure 
of Cyber physical systems is presented in section II whereas 
importance of security in the presence of existing threats is 
highlighted in section III. Finally, paper is concluded in 
section IV. 
II. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
Infrastructure plays a crucial role in deployment of every 
system; the same applies to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). In 
line with Fig. 1, the main components of CPS can be 
considered as sensors / actuators, controllers, communication 
networks [10]. However, some CPS solutions additionally 
employ gateways [11]. Importantly, CPS can be both open-
loop or closed loop systems. By the analogy with Internet of 
Things (IoT), open-loop CPS can have access to the global 
networks, and in this case such paradigms as Cloud 
Computing, BigData etc. can be added into the notion of CPS 
infrastructure. Cyber Physical systems can consist of large 
extent of heterogeneous devices, including sensors, actuators, 
etc. 
 Five level CPS architecture has been proposed in [12] 
with   layers functionality described as: (i) Smart connection 
level, (ii) Data-to-information conversion level, (iii) Cyber 
level, (iv) Cognition level, and (v) Configuration level. 
Crucial role by different architectural solutions plays the point 
of view on the system, for example in [13], CPS architecture 
is proposed from the service oriented point of view and 
consists of 4 levels as follows: (i) Perceive tier, (ii) Data tier, 
(iii) Service tier, and (iv) Execution tier. Since CPSs are the 
part of ICT area, it is important to find interrelations between 
Open Systems Interconnection Model (OSI), architectures and 
models developed for CPS. An adapted OSI model for CPS 
involves Middleware and System Infrastructure model. 
However, if CPS needs to be integrated with global networks 
such as Internet, TCP/IP model can be the best contender, 
where two lowest layers, Physical and Data, accordingly, are 
represented by just one level. Application, Transport and 
Network layers respectively form part of the other three 
layers. Fig. 2 represents some technologies and protocols 
belonging to each of the layers. 
However, this model raises the issues of choice of 
transport protocol to be the best candidate for Cyber Physical 
Systems. The need for design of new transport protocol for 
CPS systems has been highlighted in [6]. The main argument 
behind the design of the new transport protocol was increased 
reliability without any requirement of acknowledgements. 
However, challenging task to build the new transport protocol 
for CPS can face several difficulties, one of these is that there 
are many devices which support TCP/IP or UDP/IP stacks, 
accordingly issues of standardization and compatibility 
become extremely important for the design of new transport 
protocol. Equally, it is very difficult to decide about transport 
protocol independently of the underlying medium which is 
being used [14]. Despite the stated need, existing protocols 
such as connection-oriented TCP and connectionless UDP can 
offer wide functionality. Therefore, considerable level of 
reliability can be achieved by combining TCP and UDP, 
depending on messages types and data types to be transmitted 
[15]. Importantly, while making a choice of transport 
protocols for CPS, the objectives of designed system need to 
be considered and strongly met. In general, when loss tolerant 
real-time data have to be transmitted, UDP is preferred over 
TCP [16]. Since there is a need to monitor the actual state of 
physical environment, data gathered from sensors can be very 
sensitive to delays. To be able to deal with near real time 
transmission and to account for heterogeneous wireless 
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Fig. 2.   TCP/IP enabled CPS Integration model. 
technologies, a gateway approach is proposed [17]. Gateways 
bring in the fact that there will be no more end-to-end 
transmission, but through some mediator between sensing 
devices and target nodes [18]. 
Gateway structure can be very complex and is usually 
represented through layered model showing different gateway 
roles. Having said that, depending upon the role, certain 
gateways not only aggregate data from sensor nodes but from 
other gateways too. Such a layered gateway structure is 
represented in Fig. 3. 
III. SECURITY IN CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
Since potential threats can affect both the cyber and 
physical environments, thus security provision in CPS is 
extremely important at all stages, namely design, deployment 
and operation [16,17]. Moreover, as CPS are used on many 
objects of critical infrastructure, issues for protecting them 
have become extremely relevant. A system to protect a 
hydroelectric dam with particular focus on conflict resolution 
for internal policy management is discussed in [16]. The work 
discusses analysis of unauthorized network usage and 
proposes corresponding countermeasures which include 
reconfiguration of devices as well as measures ensuring 
integrity of critical data storage. The objects and people are 
represented as assets and agents respectively in Socio-CPS 
(SCPS). Though the issues related to SCPS security are 
discussed in [19], however the work presented lacks in attack 
prediction. Modern cyber physical systems require 
components- or subsystems-centric security approach to 
evaluate the possible consequences for the whole system, even 
when one of the components is compromised [20]. 
Considerable research work discusses the possibility of 
attacks on control systems in order to gain access to the 
physical part of CPS [19, 20]. As a consequence, SCADA 
systems, even though based on web technologies, are designed 
with the viewpoint to minimize the external access to critical 
infrastructure. However, convergence of SCADA systems 
with corporate and global networks have introduced new 
security threats, such as non-secure remote connections, 
knowledge availability, etc. [20]. Centralised administration 
has been proposed to tackle the issue of insecurity in remote 
connections as well as unauthorised privileges. 
A. Types of Existing Attacks 
Fig. 4 describes common attack types and their sub-types 
in Cyber Physical Systems. The intruder aims to take control 
of entire system by launching control hijacking attack, 
whereas code injection exploits system vulnerabilities by 
systematic injection of rogue piece of code to change the 
execution of the entire program. Malware attacks employ 
special software to hamper normal functioning of a system. 
Traffic sniffing or interception is practiced in case of 
eavesdropping attack, whereas the intruder impersonates itself 
in spoofing attack [19]. All attack types can be extended by 
Denial of service attacks (DoS) which is aimed at flooding the 
system in order to disable the actual services provided by the 
system [18,19]. 
Based on the above mentioned attack types several attack 
subtypes can be highlighted as follows. 
1) Spoofing Subtypes: GPS spoofing is based on 
broadcasting of incorrect signals of higher strength than 
received from satellites in order to deceive the victim [20]. 
Intruder explores the IP addresses of the victim nodes and 
then sends ARP responses to node X and node Y, with IP 
address of corresponding node and its own MAC address in 
ARP spoofing. Thus all packets between X and Y will then 
pass through the intruder node. IP spoofing is another subtype 
of spoofing attack aimed at using another IP address to pass 
through security system. This type of attack can be used on 
the first stage of complex intrusion in conjunction with 
reflected attack. 
2) Code Injection Subtypes: SQL injection attack 
involves insertion of malicious SQL statement in the queries, 
thus leading towards failure of the input data. Cross site 
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caused intrusion. Figure 6 presents the main attack vectors in 
Cyber Physical Systems. 
 
scripting exploits open scripting vulnerabilities and adds 
malicious code in to web application leading towards 
execution. Remote file injection extends itself on the serve 
side of web applications where the file with malicious code 
is downloaded and is executed on the server. Shell injection 
attack is implemented through inclusion of malicious shell 
code into the code string for further interpretation by the shell 
[20]. 
3) Eavesdropping Subtypes: Man-in-the-Middle is an 
active type of attack and occurs when intruder intervenes 
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packets. Traffic sniffing is a passive type of eavesdropping 
aimed at traffic analysis using special device or program. 
Relay attacks are aimed at interception of authentication 
related information. 
4) Malware Subtypes: Worm is a type of Malware 
software with ability of making   copies of itself thus resulting 
into wastage of network bandwidth. Virus is also able to 
replicate itself as worm, but comparatively infects files and 
programs in the system. Trojan horse intrudes in the system 
under the guise of legitimate software, whereas Rootkit is a 
set of software; such as scripts, executable files, configuration 
files, etc; with ability to hide itself and other malicious 
software. 
5) Control Hijacking Subtypes: Buffer overflow is a 
phenomenon when a program is writing data outside of the 
given buffer, often it is the consequence of the wrong 
processing of input data. Integer overflow is an error occurred 
due to inability to represent the numeric value within given 
storage space, whereas Format string is an intrusion during 
which the input string is executed as a command. Important, 
all attack types can be divided into either passive/active or 
invasive/non-invasive respectively [19]. Passive attacks, such 
as traffic sniffing, have the purpose to intercept the sensitive 
data without causing any destruction to the operation of the 
entire system. Whereas active attacks, like DoS/DDoS, code 
injections etc, are aimed at causing direct damage or to gain 
the control of the system or infrastructure [18]. 
For active attacks, main purpose is to destroy or damage 
the system. Depending on the above-mentioned attack groups, 
accordingly different protection strategies need to be 
implemented. 
B. Attack Vectors 
Threats eventually translate into attack vectors. Hardware 
based attack vectors for smart devices namely, device identity 
theft and cryptographic keys theft have been identified in [21, 
22]. Importantly, attack vectors can vary depending upon CPS 
application domain. Work presented in [21] considers medical 
implants related attacks with the purpose, either to steal the 
information, change the therapy, or render the device useless 
by exhaustion of its energy sources. In an energy management 
domain, for example smart homes, an intruder can manipulate 
energy consumption measurements resulting into energy theft 
[22]. Considerable research work has been done towards 
automatic identification of attack vectors, such as data 
disclosure and resources disruption etc. [21]. Knowledge 
based attack vector presented in [22] assumes that the intruder 
may not possess the necessary knowledge about physical 
processes and ways to take control of the system. However, 
the attacker implements five steps of intrusion: access, 
 
Fig. 4.  Common attack types and their subtypes. 
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discovery, control, damage and cleanup accordingly, to gain 
full control of the system in direct or indirect way and to hide 
any traces of any caused intrusion. Fig. 5 presents the main 
attack vectors in Cyber Physical Systems. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cyber-Physical Systems are complex systems based on 
convergence of physical or hardware and cyber or software 
components. CPS has large variety of application areas: 
among others are transport, healthcare, wearable’s, home 
automation etc. The number of deployed CPS steadily 
increase, which causes several challenges related to security 
and safety. Importance of new complex approaches in the area 
of Security and Privacy for CPS considering the influence of 
single components and subsystems threats on the whole 
system is discussed. Some salient threats and attack vectors 
were reviewed and debated. More discussion is needed 
towards threats modelling, which is very important on design 
stage to develop security mechanisms as well as to evaluate 
possible damage to the systems under different circumstances. 
Necessity of joint security and safety consideration in order to 
identify the most complete set of potential threats also needs 
to be highlighted as future work in the paper. 
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